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LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION AND
POLITICIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES IN
THE 1980'S
BY CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
The provision of legal assistance for the poor has mirrored, since its first ap-
pearance in 1880, the social and political attitudes of the American people and
their governments. Each of the four distinct periods, into which the history of
legal aid in the United States can be divided, reflects a fundamental change in
these attitudes. This paper analyzes these periods, the reasons for the change
and the type of delivery system that emerged in each.
The fourth of these major attitudinal shifts has only recently emerged. Concern
is expressed about the future of the concept of legal aid, particularly in light of
recent government resistance to the growing belief that access to legal services is
not a privilege but a right of all citizens.
I. INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO
CURRENT TRENDS
Legal Services for the poor" in civil matters2 in the United States
have been marked by three distinct historical periods: private legal aid
(1880-1965), government support, through the War on Poverty's Office
of Economic Opportunity (1965-1974) and government support of an
independent financing corporation, the Legal Services Corporation
(1974-present). In recent years, since the change of the political regime
in Washington in 1980, it has become apparent that legal aid may be
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. This National Report on Legal
Aid in the United States was prepared for the Second International Congress on Procedural Law.
This report was supported, in part, by research funds made available by the UCLA Law
School and by a grant from the National Science Foundation for a larger study on legal services
attorneys. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Robert S. Meadow who read this report
and made useful suggestions and to Alison Graves for her thorough research assistance.
I This report focuses on problems of access to justice for the poor. In the United States
access to justice remains a problem for the working and lower middle classes as well, but this
report deals primarily with access issues for those who would be eligible for government supported
legal aid. The term "legal aid" has been used both generically and specifically to refer to a partic-
ular period in the development of legal aid in American history. The term "legal services" has
increasingly come to be used to describe the present programme for provision of legal aid to the
poor. See text accompanying note 36, infra.
This report focuses primarily on the availability of civil legal aid. Although the report deals
briefly with legal aid for the indigent in criminal matters, generally supplied by the state as a
result of American constitutional principles, it is issues of the access of civil justice that forms
most of the present controversy.
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entering a fourth period, the resolution of which may be crucial in de-
fining the goals and purposes of legal services in the United States. The
issues which have been raised in this fourth period are a blunt confron-
tation of the underlying philosophical debates about legal services
which have been waged during the last three periods. Whether there
will be a resolution of these issues remains to be seen, but it is clear we
are at a crossroads in the development of legal services for the poor in
the United States.
The development of legal services programmes in the United
States has been sufficiently long-standing and sophisticated to have pro-
duced a variety of types of legal services delivery systems as well as a
relatively rich body of literature and commentary on the evaluation of
such programmes and interpretations of the meaning of these develop-
ments. In addition, there have been some empirical studies of what it is
that legal services for the poor are actually doing. This paper will re-
port interpretively on trends in the delivery of legal services to the poor
and the issues these trends raise for further elaboration and develop-
ment of the legal aid concept.
The basic theme of this paper is that the currently dominant form
of delivery - the staff programme - has resulted in two seemingly
inconsistent, but quite logical, trends: the professionalization of legal
services lawyers and the politicization of the legal services programme.
By professionalization, what is meant is the development of a sophisti-
cated, separate group of lawyers whose primary function is the provi-
sion of legal services to the poor, with concerns and socialization that
differentiate them from other lawyers and servants of the poor.
Politicization means that the legal services programme has become,
once again, an issue of partisan debate because of its perceived role as
an instrument of social, as well as legal, change.
These trends are quite understandable, given the controversies
which have emerged in the three historical periods. There are five such
controversies. First, is the debate over private versus public funding for
legal aid. Second, there have been discussions of equal access to justice
(availability of lawyers to represent individual clients) versus social
change (ameliorating the conditions of poverty) models of the purpose
of legal services. This controversy is reflected concretely in the debates
about neighbourhood law offices versus law reform centres and judicare
versus centralized staff offices. Third is the issue of segregated versus
integrated notions of the legal needs of the poor, evidenced by disputes
about developing expertise in "poverty law," both substantively (wel-
fare law) and procedurally (community organizing, group litigation).
Fourth are the questions of the effectiveness (however defined) of deliv-
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ery systems, represented by critiques from within3 and without.4 A fifth
controversy is seen in the ongoing, but at times hidden, dispute about
whether the provision of legal services to the poor is an obligation, with
a corresponding right inhering in members of the poor classes, or an
act of charity, experienced as a privilege by members of the poor clas-
ses, by an otherwise well-endowed society.5 Because the history of legal
services has been so well canvassed elsewhere,6 it will be reviewed only
briefly here. The purpose of this brief review is to underscore the his-
torical antecedents of current trends and issues in legal services as they
have come to affect several different constituencies - the poor, their
lawyers, other lawyers, policy makers and the public.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN LEGAL AID
In reviewing trends in the development of legal aid in the United
States it is essential to note those characteristics of legal aid which are
peculiarly American. In 1977, Clinton Bamberger, then a member of
the Legal Services Corporation national staff, identified three "immuta-
ble characteristics" of the American legal aid system: 1) public financ-
ing, 2) law reform (rule changes) for the poor and 3) full-time salaried
staff lawyers, specializing in poverty law.7 To these characteristics, two
more could be added. First is the employment of paralegals, who are
legal assistants, trained especially to aid in providing services to the
poor and many of whom were drawn from the indigenous poverty com-
munity. The second is the use of explicitly political forms of advocacy
to better the conditions under which poor people live. These include
community organizing and lobbying, national research or "back-up"
centres, specializing in certain areas of law affecting the poor, and the
3 Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience (1977), 4 NLADA
Briefcase 6.
4 Brakel, Judicare (1974).
5 The United States Constitution provides for the provision of an attorney in all criminal
matters with the potential for incarceration. This constitutional principle was finally developed,
after many years of litigation over the issues in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See
also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). On the civil side, however, the Supreme Court
has not shown itself as hospitable to a claim that a lawyer should be paid for by the state if the
individual litigant cannot afford to pay for a lawyer, except in a few particular areas. See Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
6 See, e.g., Johnson, Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the American Legal Ser-
vices Program (1974); Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor (1981), 26 Vill. L. Rev. 26;
Bellow, supra note 3; Bamberger, The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform and
Staff Attorneys (1977), 10 Cornell Int'l L. J. 207; Stumpf, H., Community Politics and Legal
Services (1975); Handler, "Perspectives on Legal Aid: United States," in Zemans, ed., Perspec-
tives on Legal Aid: An International Survey (1975).
7 Bamberger, id.
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use of peculiarly American legal constructs to fight the legal battles of
the poor - the class action, group plaintiffs and American constitu-
tional theory as a device for expanding both substantive and procedural
legal rights.8
In recent years the legal services "movement" in the United States
has also been characterized by another American institution - the
professional union - as increasing numbers of legal services lawyers,
paralegals and staff form their own unions or join with other existing
unions.9 Related to this phenomenon is the increasing "management"
of legal services by American business management and economic prin-
ciples, evidenced by the use of "cost-benefit" analyses of the effective-
ness of programme designs or specific delivery mechanisms 0 and the
addition of a management section to the national legal services journal,
the Clearinghouse Law Review."1
Finally, the organized bar, in the form of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, has come to support the legal services movement in a series of
heated political debates in Congress. This support, a continuation of an
early history of establishment bar support for legal aid, has become
stronger in recent years. Some see recognition of the expansion of law-
yer's work in general as the reason for this support and others see the
support as emanating primarily from big firm lawyers who, in the strat-
ification of the American legal system, have little to lose in the way of
competition from legal aid lawyers.
It may be all too easy to identify these modern American charac-
teristics of legal aid since they have, all too quickly, become taken for
granted in the legal services world. But these characteristics are accu-
rate only for the most recent periods of legal aid development since the
Office of Economic Opportunity [hereinafter OEO] programme began,
amidst much controversy, in 1965. Because these "immutable charac-
teristics" are less than twenty years old, they are very much at issue in
the current political debate about legal services. The present adminis-
tration advocates a return to the earliest historical period of legal aid,
characterized by voluntary, private and charitable provision of legal
services by lawyers who are not necessarily engaged full time in legal
work for the poor.
8 See Dooley and Houseman, Legal Services in the 80's and Challenges Facing the Poor
(1982), 15 Clearinghouse L. Rev. 704.
9 See Schorr, Unionization in Legal Services (1980), 14 Clearinghouse L. Rev. 836.
10 Legal Services Corporation, Delivery Systems Study (1980).
" Lieberman, Management Failures in Legal Services Program: A Structural Dilemma
(1980), 14 Clearinghouse L. Rev. 139.
[VOL.22, NO. I
Legal Services
I1. THE LEGAL AID ERA: 1876-1965
For the first one hundred years of the American legal system poor
people depended on the "charity" of lawyers to take their cases for free
or at reduced fees.12 The organized bar encouraged such activity as
part of the duty of the individual member of the profession to the pub-
lic at large. As others have noted,13 the legal system was thought to be
working well and lawyers played a smaller part in it than in other
countries, at least in the early years marked by small towns and fron-
tier justice. Although portions of the Constitution could have been read
to require a lawyer, such interpretations of the Constitution did not
occur until late in the twentieth century.' 4 Work done for individual
indigents was called pro bono publico, for the public good. Legal char-
ity work, like other forms of charity, was considered useful because it
released the rest of society from its worries about or obligations to the
poor. As Auerbach noted in his history of the legal profession, Unequal
Justice, the legal profession in the United States was stratified by so-
cial class and national origin. Thus, it is not surprising that the first
successful effort in providing legal aid to the poor was organized by the
German Society in New York City in 1876 to provide aid to recent
German immigrants who were being taken advantage of by a variety of
merchants, landlords and others who used complex legal processes.
The second legal aid group founded in the United States arose out
of another charitable concern - the reported debaucheries of young
girls in Chicago. This legal services group, however, can be seen as the
first legal aid organization with a "reformist" purpose. Formed as an
adjunct to the "Women's Club" of Chicago in 1886, its purpose was
the "protection of women and children." It eventually led to the forma-
tion of a legal aid organization, available to any poor person regardless
of gender or nationality, that also attempted to "reform" law, generally
by proposing legislative changes.' 5
Both of these organizations set the stage for legal aid societies for
many years. They were private organizations, financed by private char-
itable contributions and controlled by boards of directors, virtually in-
distinguishable from other charitable organizations. Legal services were
"doled" out frequently because of moral merit, rather than legal right,
and controversies developed early in prohibiting the provision of divorce
11 Explored in Katz, Poor People's Lawyers in Transition (1982) and in Auerbach, Unequal
Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (1976).
'a Auerbach, id., Handler and Johnson, supra note 6.
" Supra note 5.
"See Katz, supra note 12.
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services that would divide families and possibly increase the drain of
poverty on society. Legal aid societies, as they first developed, consisted
either of referral systems to private lawyers who would take cases for a
small or no fee, or of small staff programmes, the lawyers of which
were, in terms of ethnicity and legal training, different from the profes-
sion as a whole. The boards of directors remained composed of white,
male Anglo-Saxons.1
A big expansion in legal aid occurred in 1919 with the publication
of Reginald Smith's Justice and the Poor which documented the cost
of legal services and access to the legal system. The book was signifi-
cant because it aroused the American Bar Association enough that it
formed a standing committee on legal aid, to be headed by Smith. This
later led to the founding of the National Legal Aid and Defender Asso-
ciation, an association of legal aid, legal services and public defender
programmes that survives into the present and has been currently ac-
tive in the political battles facing the legal services movement. As a
result of Smith's work, many state and local bar associations began
forming legal aid associations and societies, modelled on the first
programmes founded in the large cities. In 1914, the first legal aid pro-
gramme affiliated with a law school was founded in Denver, providing
legal services for the poor and clinical training for law students at the
same time. Some commentators have argued that while the develop-
ment of legal aid can be applauded as one of the first in the western
world, Smith's message, published in 1919, was heard by others as a
centrist gift to the immigrant masses which would prevent the gap in
access to the legal system from being connected to a gap in economic
access that might lead to more revolutionary developments. 17
There was slow growth in the number of legal aid organizations
for the next few decades as the depression of the 1930s and the lack of
available paying work for lawyers served to limit both economic and
human resource support for legal aid. Only when Great Britain insti-
tuted its government financed Legal Aid and Advice Scheme in 1949
was there a resurgence in American activity. Again, some commenta-
tors18 view these developments as centrist or conservative reformist at-
tempts at staving off more radical actions - in this case, governmental
or public support of legal aid for the poor.
By the end of this first period in 1962, there were 236 legal aid
organizations, 110 defender offices (providing legal services for the
24 Supra note 12.
17 See Auerbach, supra note 12.
18 E.g. Johnson, supra note 6.
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criminally accused) and a total national budget of just under four mil-
lion dollars.19 Even so, these numbers were woefully inadequate to meet
the demands for legal services of millions of poor people. A study com-
pleted in the mid-sixties20 revealed that three out of four applicants for
legal aid received nothing more than a single brief consultation and
there was some evidence for concluding that many potential applicants
for legal aid never bothered to apply. In addition, pressure from busi-
ness and "moralistic" or religious members of the boards of directors
were successful in prohibiting legal assistance for bankruptcies, evic-
tions and divorces, even though laws clearly provided for the exercise of
these legal rights. Furthermore, high staff turnover and low salaries
made it difficult, if not impossible, for the programmes to develop any
continuity, sense of purpose or analysis of the legal structural factors
which contributed to the experience of poverty. Indeed, as that study
concluded, Legal Aid had become "a captive of its principal financial
supporters."
It is important to highlight some of the characteristics of this early
period. Although others see the creation of the OEO programmes as a
radical departure from the Legal Aid movement, there are some impor-
tant historical continuities, which have come to haunt us, particularly
in recent times. First, the source of funding for legal aid has always
been problematic. If private financiers can capture a programme and
limit the cases it takes, so can public financing, as evidenced by statu-
tory limitations on the case types that can be handled by government
funded legal services programmes. The Legal Services Corporation
statute currently prohibits representation in school desegregation, abor-
tion and other areas.21 Far more stringent limitations have been re-
cently proposed and passed, most notably that legal services lawyers
will be prohibited from suing the government in class actions and from
representing aliens and homosexuals.
Furthermore, the early philosophical underpinnings of the Legal
Aid movement of providing individual representation for "deserving"
cases continues to affect legal services delivery systems today. With
more demands for services than can possibly be met, programmes must
establish priorities and decide who is to receive some of the available,
but limited resources. Some continue to argue that the most "deserv-
29 Id.
20 Carlin, Howard and Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor (1966).
21 42 U.S.C. §2996f(b)(7) and (8). See Greene, Keysir and Nadas, Depoliticizing Legal
Aid: A Constitutional Analysis (1976), 81 Cornell L. Rev. 734.
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ing" should receive, aid. 2
The basic impetus for developing legal aid programmes in the first
place, providing access to the legal system, remains the rhetorical basis
for legal services to the present, and was its fundamental principle in
the third stage where an access goal of two lawyers for every 10,000
poor was the objective of programme managers.23 Issues of board of
director control, staff turnover and composition of the early Legal Aid
programmes sound remarkably familiar to those reading modern evalu-
ations of the Legal Services programmes.2 4 The early Legal Aid refer-
ral plans look remarkably like the judicare referral programmes cur-
rently advocated by some.25
There are some historical discontinuities as well. Legal Aid, unlike
legal services, attracted lawyers who wanted to avoid or who could not
enter traditional practices and they tended not to have political com-
mitments to their work.26 Legal Aid work was low-profile charity work,
seldom, if ever, resulting in litigation at all and if litigation, then infre-
quently rule change litigation. Poor people were seldom, if ever, person-
ally involved in governing legal aid societies or having input into what
kind of work would be done.
The significance of these early legal aid developments in the
United States must be underscored in the present climate of attempts
to disembowel legal services for the poor. First, legal services for the
poor was, from the beginning, a political phenomenon. Smith argued
that the provision of legal services to the poor was essential to preserve
"American democracy." Without access to the legal system, the poor
might rebel. Second, the ambivalence of the organized bar to a pro-
gramme that provides the profession in general with more work, but
invites a purportedly unsavoury group of non-establishment lawyers to
the practice (which in turn provides difficulties for the clients of estab-
lishment lawyers) serves to exacerbate the stratification within the non-
legal services portion of the bar. Third, private voluntary financing of
legal aid affects the type of case and legal strategies that can be em-
ployed. This principle motivated the early founders of Legal Aid as
"See Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis (1980), 60 N. C. L. Rev. 281.
13 See Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States (1980), 14 Clearinghouse L. Rev. 337 and
Ehrlich, Giving Low Income Americans Minimum Access to Legal Services (1978), 64 A.B.A.J.
696; Legal Services for Poor People (1981), 30 Catholic U. L. Rev. 483.
24 See, supra note 10; Katz, supra note 12 and Erlanger, Social Reform Organizations and
Subsequent Careers of Participants: A Follow-Up of Early Participation in the OEO Legal Ser-
vices Program (1977), 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 233; Lawyers and Neighborhood Legal Services Social
Background and the Impetus for Reform (1978), 12 Law & Soc. Rev. 253.
"' Supra note 4.
26 See Handler, supra note 6, and Katz, supra note 12.
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much as it motivates those who seek to return legal services to the pri-
vate sector today. Fourth, legal aid programmes were, for the most
part, locally supported and operated. This form of local control has per-
sisted to the present day. Even though the federal Legal Services Cor-
poration distributes grants, the grants are received and utilized by local
programmes with local boards of directors. While legal services has be-
come federalized in some respects, it remains in other important re-
spects a local programme. Those who urge modification of the pro-
gramme want to return to an even narrower form of local control.
Finally, and perhaps most important, while they were private,
moralistic, paternalistic, ineffective, individualistic and badly sup-
ported, Legal Aid societies at least developed the notion that provision
of legal services for the poor was a legitimate, if not necessary, function
of the American legal system. Compared to other "charitable" develop-
ments of the late nineteenth century, it has had a remarkable staying
power. The significance of the Legal Aid movement is that it was a
beginning. The danger is that the present political administration seeks
to return the provision of legal services to privately funded, voluntary,
local programmes that will individually represent moral or deserving
poor, without attempting to change or expand the law. The current de-
bate is remarkably reminiscent of the debate which marked the transi-
tion from the first historical period to the second.
IV. THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: 1965-1974
In the early 1960s a controversial book by Michael Harrington,
The Other America2 which documented the extent of American pov-
erty, caused poverty to become a national issue. A "War on Poverty"
was declared in 1963 and made the basis for legislation that was to
draw the federal government into funding a variety of social program-
mes that would eliminate poverty. This "War on Poverty" had some
new characteristics: the poor were to participate in the governance of
programmes which affected them, and the causes of poverty were to be
attacked structurally and comprehensively with a combination of cash
27 The present proposals to radically reorganize legal services contemplate more local control
in the sense of state control. One proposal would give governors the right to veto programs. An-
other would attach legal services to block grants to be divided at the state level with a variety of
social programmes competing for the same money. Although legal services presently is "locally"
organized and controlled, the money remains federally controlled. The Reagan proposals contem-
plate a different locality, the states, which some see as far more conservative and potentially hos-
tile to social programmes like legal services. See Erie, Rein and Wiget, Women and the Reagan
Revolution; Thermidor for the Social Welfare Economy (unpub. paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego, Cal., 1982).
2 Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (1962).
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transfer programmes and social programmes which delivered services
to the poor; one of those programmes included legal services.
As a result of private funding by the Ford Foundation of some
small demonstration projects of neighbourhood community-based legal
services offices, a new philosophy of legal services for the poor was de-
veloped. This new philosophy viewed the law as simultaneously an op-
portunity to serve the poor and a tool for oppression of the poor. The
opportunity lay in compelling enforcement of laws that benefitted the
poor or made them "more equal" to other members of society. The
oppression lay in rules which hurt the poor as a class, either substan-
tively or procedurally, by limiting their access to courts and other soci-
etal institutions. The new philosophy, explicated by Edgar and Jean
Cahn and Edward Sparer29 involved using the law, by effecting law
reform, either by rule change or rule enforcement, to achieve social
justice. Lawyers for the poor were urged to use available legal forms
and arguments, such as the class action for aggregations of claims, and
to develop new modes and novel constitutional arguments, such as the
right to travel, to achieve a broader based social justice than the simple
individual representation model of lawyering that dominated legal aid
programmes.
When it became clear that one of the new "War on Poverty"
programmes, located in the OEO, was to fund legal services for the
poor, a controversy raged between those who advocated supporting the
already existing structure of legal aid programmes and those who advo-
cated support for the newer and broader based neighbourhood legal
services programmes. The National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion passed a resolution seeking to limit the awarding of OEO funds to
already existing programmes. The Cahns, who had been working in the
Kennedy Administration, however, were successful with the help of sev-
eral other notable and devoted people, in obtaining American Bar As-
sociation support for the new OEO programme.
Lewis Powell, -then president of the American Bar Association,
and now Justice of the Supreme Court, was instrumental in this alli-
ance between the establishment bar and the "radical" legal services
reformers. Earl Johnson, one of the early staff members of the OEO
programme, has called Powell a "visionary realist" for his support of
legal services. Powell's reasons can be read, in light of subsequent
events, as prophetic. Powell was concerned, particularly after a line of
Supreme Court decisions ° had made clear that alternative forms of
" See Johnson, supra note 6, for a much more complete version of this history.
" NACCP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainman v. State Bar
of Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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delivery of legal services might be constitutionally permissible, that, if
the legal profession did not broaden its client base and methods of
structuring the delivery of legal services, it was likely that the legal
profession's control over its own diminishing business was to be abro-
gated by others. Although Powell initially focused on a class of lower
middle class clients to be assisted by other forms of bar service, it was
not difficult for him to make a transition to support for poor people's
programmes in order to increase the legal profession's client base.
The crucial principle extracted from the support of the American
Bar Association was the recognition that poor people's lawyers were to
be able to do for their clients what rich clients' lawyers did for them.
Known now by the epithet of "hired gun," this principle, that poor peo-
ple's lawyers would be governed by rules no different from those of
their brethren in private practice (the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity), has become one of the foundations of modern legal services prac-
tice, though it remains one of the controversial features of the present
programme.
Related to this concern was the final issue of OEO poverty law
office structure - whether a lawyer's programme would be controlled
by non-lawyer government bureaucrats, in the OEO's Community Ac-
tion Program. By 1965, the new organization's structure was in place,
with a director, Clinton Bamberger, who had come from private law
practice. Bamberger successfully achieved, after a difficult campaign,
the support of local bar associations and the old legal aid programmes.
The OEO programme was to award financial grants, on a local level, to
programmes that submitted grant proposals supported by the local bar
and local community groups. In achieving this support, Bamberger was
successful in changing the sense of mission about legal services for the
poor and the accompanying rhetoric. Bamberger, with his private prac-
tice experience, was able to persuade legal aid groups and local bar
associations that the role of the poverty lawyer had to be an activist
one. Bamberger saw the 1960s as a time in which social change was
going to come. The only question was whether lawyers would be in-
volved or not.31
The process of funding local OEO offices raised all of the issues
again. Grant proposals required the participation of such diverse groups
as already established legal aid offices, local bar associations, poverty
groups and community input. Disputes arose among establishment bar
groups, rank and file lawyers, minority lawyers, community activists,
31 Johnson, supra note 6, at 80.
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bar associations and local government entities over control of the
programmes. Ted Finman has illustrated elsewhere3 2 how these differ-
ent groups and their respective ideologies affected the funding process.
In some communities, older legal aid societies received grants. In most
communities new groups were formed and funded, and eventually in
most but not all cities, the Legal Aid societies either were transformed
into legal services programmes with a change of personnel or they were
simply swallowed or merged. By the end of fiscal year 1966, over one
hundred grants had been made to local communities and law schools
running legal service programmes, at a total expenditure of over
twenty-five million dollars.
The programmes initially funded were diverse, from very small
programmes to major metropolitan programmes, with multiple offices.
What characterized these OEO offices and made them different from
the legal aid societies was their clear eligibility standards, their boards
of directors which were required to have local poverty community
members, a national support system which eventually provided training
for lawyers on a national level, a staff which seemed to be more explic-
itly committed to a law reform agenda"3 and some new legal theories
and strategies with which to do their work.3' Of course, perhaps most
significant was the era itself. The 1960s in the United States was a
time for social change and political activism. Whatever controversies
the activist lawyers found themselves in, their actions were mild when
compared with other things that were happening simultaneously in the
larger society.35
Once again, while the OEO period was heralded by some as a rad-
ical departure from the past, it tended to preserve some important fea-
tures of the old programmes. First, despite the national financing struc-
ture, grants were made to local programmes and the programmes
remained subject to local control. Second, although the philosophy of
law reform resulted in some highly publicized big legal victories, most
often in the context of welfare litigation, the day to day business of
most OEO legal services offices was individual representation, usually
defensively, in evictions, consumer matters, domestic relations matters
32 Finman, OEO Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change: The Relation-
ship Between Program Ideology and Program Performance, [1971] Wisconsin L. Rev. 1001.
3 See Bellow, supra notes 3 and 23; Erlanger, supra note 24, and Katz, Routine and Re-
form A Study of Personal and Collective Careers in Legal Aid (unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept.
Sociology, Northwestern University, 1976).
" See Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People (1970), 79 Yale L.J. 1949 and Cahn and
Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 1317.
" Keniston, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth (1968).
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and public benefits. The only difference was a stratification that began
to develop in legal services offices between neighbourhood offices which
tended to perform the individual case work and central offices, primar-
ily in the urban programmes, which tended to do the larger law reform
or rule change cases. Third, clients were still seen based on their "des-
sert". Strict financial eligibility requirements substituted for moral des-
sert, but the effect was still to segregate the poor as a separate class for
purposes of delivering legal services.
The major differences between the old and new programmes, triv-
ial as they might seem, are best represented in the change of name
which occurred in 1965. From that time on, programmes receiving
their financial support primarily from the federal government (there
continued to be some local and municipal funding) called themselves
"legal services" rather than "legal aid." The new breed of lawyers s
saw themselves as providing a service their society required, rather
than charity workers "aiding" the morally needy and deserving.
More important for the subsequent development of legal services,
the establishment in 1965 of the OEO programme began a massive
infusion of federal funds into the legal services for the poor program-
mes. Accompanying the federal money was a sense of participation in a
legal services "movement" that was larger than individual service cases
and that began a national network for lawyers committed to working
for some common goals. Attorneys working in legal services were full-
time salaried staff attorneys, working together in offices throughout the
country, toward common goals. The goals remained dual - individual
service on legal cases and law reform - but the emphasis on case spe-
cialization and law reform, either in the form of rule change or rule
enforcement, had begun to change the underlying ideology of legal ser-
vices to one of using the law to eliminate poverty and the conditions
which produced it and exacerbated it. A few programmes even began
using non-legal techniques, banding together with community organiza-
tions and social protest movements37 to organize other ways to change
the laws or ameliorate poverty.
Indeed, the use of a few, but highly publicized new tactics or law-
suits produced the virulent criticism from without3 and occasionally,
3s There is still some scholarly dispute about whether these new lawyers differed substantially
from their counterparts in legal aid or other forms of practice. See Erlanger, supra note 24; Katz,
supra note 12, and Meadow and Menkel-Meadow, "The Origins of Political Commitment: Back-
ground Factors and Ideology Among Legal Services Attorneys" (paper presented to the Law and
Society Assoc., June 3-6, 1982, Toronto, Canada).
37 Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements (1978).
" Agnew, What's Wrong With the Legal Services Program? (1972), 58 A.B.A.J. 930.
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from within 9 that began the move to create yet a third form of legal
services delivery that would "depoliticize" 40 legal services both from
the politics of its lawyers, internally, and from both national and local
governments, externally. Thus, in the early 1970s the Legal Services
Corporation was born out of still another controversial debate about
legal services that raised many of the same issues and a few new ones.
V. THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: 1974-1980
The early 1970s ushered in a time of Nixonion backlash to the
social ferment of the 1960s. The legal services programme was one of
the targets of this backlash. Then Vice-President Agnew criticized the
programme by calling its lawyers "ideological vigilantes. 41 The then
governor of California, Ronald Reagan, attempted to terminate the
California Rural Legal Assistance Program, one of the most aggressive
law reform programmes and which was tied in the public mind with
Caesar Chavez's farm worker unionization drive among migrant work-
ers in California fields. Nixon appointed Howard Phillips, a director of
OEO, who was publicly hostile to legal services, and who eventually
fired the director of the legal services programme.42 Between 1971 and
1974 the programme experienced a thirteen percent decrease in the
number of attorneys, a four million dollar drop in funds and a forty
percent drop in the number of offices.4
3
Why was all of this political attention directed at one of the lowest
budgeted federal programmes? Several reasons have been offered by a
variety of insiders, scholars and commentators.
A. Law Reform
First, although there has always been a dispute about how much
"law reform" activity the programme actually engaged in, several ma-
jor lawsuits brought a great deal of attention to the programme. Law-
suits brought by OEO offices included those which established a consti-
tutional right to a procedurally fair hearing at any welfare termination,
a constitutional right to have welfare benefits granted without a waiting
period, statutory rights to have only actual income counted for purposes
of considering welfare eligibility (rather than "assumed contributions"
39 See Bellow, supra note 3.
40 See Greene et aL, supra note 21.
41 Supra note 38.
42 Johnson, supra note 6.
43 Supra note 3.
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from relatives or live-in companions, for example), constitutional and
statutory rights were established for children, prisoners and the men-
tally ill and the institutionalized. Tenants were permitted to withhold
rent if their housing was sub-standard. The significance of these law-
suits is that they were successful. As a result of the new programmes
(and a few lawyers in them), the poor were able to establish, as a mat-
ter of constitutional or statutory principle, that they had rights, not
privileges, coming to them in the form of many of the social welfare
programmes."
Following the success of the early lawsuits, many legal services
lawyers spent much of their time attending the procedural due process
hearings they had won for their welfare clients. It was clear that the
latter was simple "individual representation," but it was derived from
the victories of the earlier larger lawsuits. Thus, opponents of the pro-
gramme had to limit the type of activity that, by its very success, would
create a series of important but basic, and soon to become mundane (in
the number of welfare hearings), rights that would also become estab-
lished claims. Thus, this first attempt to "integrate" the poor, by giving
them some of the same rights as others received routinely, was viewed
as a direct threat to the social order.
Second, law reform meant several different things. The use of class
actions gave legal services attorneys the opportunity to use a provision
of the civil law to aggregate claims and sue more expeditiously for a
number of people affected by the same rule. The class action legal
form, however, served in some cases to organize people with common
interests beyond their lawsuits. Client groups, such as the National
Welfare Rights Organization, served as plaintiffs in lawsuits, or-
ganizers of their clients who wanted to protest, and as a service organi-
zation, providing advice for people who needed to learn how to navigate
the deep waters of the welfare system. These groups were available to
serve as plaintiffs whenever an attorney spotted an injustice in the rules
which needed legal correction. What disturbed the opponents of legal
services here was the notion that lawyers would act proactively in spot-
ting legal issues, searching for clients and then bringing lawsuits. To
the legal services attorneys who regarded themselves as on "retainer"
to their group clients, they were doing nothing more than law firm law-
yers who sought rule changes for their corporate clients or who lobbied
against adverse administrative rulings or regulations in Washington.
They were simply monitoring the legal terrain for their clients as any
41 Reich, The New Property (1980).
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lawyer would do for his client. Opponents of legal services, however,
felt that legal services lawyers should be more limited in what they
could do for their clients, thus seeking to segregate not only the poor,
but their lawyers as well.
Third, law reform consisted of several different legal activities.
The term has been imprecisely used since the beginning. One form of
law reform was rule change, most commonly the voiding of a statute
affecting the poor because of its unconstitutionality. The requirement
of fees for the court monopolized access to the fundamental right of
divorce is one such case.45 Establishment of new rights, such as those
listed above, are another example. But "law reform" is interchangeably
used with "impact litigation," a term which may include rule changes
but which also includes aggregated claims and rule enforcement. By
using class actions or other forms of claim aggregations, for example,
requests for preliminary injunctions, legal services lawyers were able to
have an impact on large numbers of people without representing each
one. Employment discrimination cases were commonly brought this
way. It was infrequent that a rule would be changed, but fact situations
arising out of patterns and practices of discrimination in certain indus-
tries (the trucking industry being a classic example) could be litigated
at one time with remedial orders affecting large numbers of minority
and women employees at once. Finally, law reform or impact work was
at its most successful when it was used to enforce rules which already
existed but which were not being enforced, frequently to the detriment
of the poor. Examples of this include suits forcing hospitals granted
federal Hill-Burton funds to treat, free of charge, poor patients as a
little-enforced condition of the federal grant, and suits to enforce police
action for inter-spousal violence, "family" problems which occur dis-
proportionately among the otherwise disadvantaged.46
Thus, law reform became a new, if limited activity, of the new
legal services programmes and the tip of the iceberg attracted most of
the attention. The hostility which law reform activities provoked must
be seen as a concern not so much for the rule changes which were
effected, although these were and still are significant and costly for the
governments,47 but for what they meant about the change of structure
in legal services. First, the source of funding was public and many of
the lawsuits were against governmental agencies, both federal and
state, particularly in the area of legal rule enforcement. Many oppo-
45 Boddie v. Connecticut, 329 F. Supp. 844.
46 Martin, Battered Wives (1977).
7 Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse (1978), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125.
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nents of legal services felt it was inappropriate for the programmes to
bite off the hands that were feeding them, much as the business inter-
ests on the original Legal Aid boards did not want to be sued or de-
fended by the lawyers they were supporting. Second, the lawyers
broadened their vision of what it meant to be a lawyer for the poor.
Many were proactive, rather than reactive (indeed, some feel the great-
est difference between legal aid and legal services lawyers was that the
former usually represented defendants and the latter more often repre-
sented plaintiffs).4 8 More importantly, they saw their role as monitor-
ing or advising their clients about how the law affected them in ways
which they saw to be no different than the way other lawyers behaved.
Even if the poor were not to be truly integrated in society, their lawyers
would at least attempt some integration of function within their profes-
sion. This did not please some members of the profession and many
outside it.
Third, this new form of activity developed in legal services attor-
neys an expertise in a new subject called "poverty law," which included
substantive areas (welfare law, as complex as a taxation specialization)
and procedural law (many of the legal services attorneys became the
most sophisticated federal and constitutional litigators). The develop-
ment of this expertise was supported, in the late 1960s and early 1970s
by the formation of federally supported national "back-up" centres
which did legal research and supported law reform efforts and occa-
sionally became involved in lobbying efforts, on both a national and
state level for rule changes or rule monitoring. The development of this
expertise fed into the continuing debate about the proper forms of de-
livery of legal services because, to the extent expertise was necessary to
represent the poor, it became more difficult to employ a judicare system
which referred cases to private and less expert lawyers. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, although there was tension within the pro-
gramme between "downtown or law reform lawyers" and
neighbourhood office "field workers," the visibility of law reform work
organized legal services lawyers around a common vision and commit-
ment that began to "professionalize" the commitment to legal services
and to nationalize it, while the programmes remained local. As Katz
has argued,49 the sharing of law reform pleadings and job announce-
ments in the national legal services journal tended to develop a sense of
common purpose and community among legal services attorneys
around the country.
48 Katz, supra note 12.
49 Id.
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B. Nationalization of the Programme
Aside from the law reform efforts, other factors contributed to
these developments. Many legal services lawyers were recruited from
the VISTA and Reginald Heber Smith fellowship programmes, which
gave them training periods, however short, that united and socialized
them with other legal services lawyers. And, once the initial period of
OEO funding was regularized, the national legal services programme
began training lawyers in regional and national meetings that brought
legal services attorneys together. Training programmes became even
stronger and more national with the creation of a training centre in the
central Washington office.
C. Increased Individual Service Work
At the same time, it must be remembered that the bulk of the
legal services work was day to day service for clients in matters dealing
with public benefits, family law, consumer transactions, employment
and housing. What was notable was that the bulk was increasing. By
1971, 1,237,275 individual applicants had been seen by a legal services
office, up from only 426,457 in the first year of OEO operation, 1965.50
Although this development never received as much press, it was just as
significant in the opposition to the OEO programme. The large num-
bers of cases handled persuaded some members of the bar that there
were clients available for private bar and arguments for judicare type
programmes became loud and strident.51 In addition, even the individ-
ual cases were costly to governments. Many of these cases resulted in
increasing the number eligible for a variety of public benefit program-
mes and the procedural hearings which were now almost routinely re-
quired, increased government personnel costs. As a result of their legal
representation in individual matters, both clients and lawyers learned to
deal with government bureaucracies and private merchants and each
became more aggressive and adept at dealing with systems that other-
wise preferred docility.
52
D. Client Involvement and Participation
Client involvement on legal service's boards also created more ac-
tive participation, occasionally causing tension within programmes
among clients, boards and staff lawyers. Clients formed their own na-
50 Johnson, supra note 6, at 188.
s Supra note 4.
" Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy (1980).
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tional organization to work with Legal Services (National Clients
Council), a group that was then able to become active in continuing
lobbying efforts for the preservation of legal services.
Because of these and other complaints about legal services, there
were yearly efforts, during the Nixon administration, to eliminate legal
services in Congress. Without repeating the Congressional arguments
and legislative history here,53 a compromise was finally reached in 1974
when a new act created yet a new form of legal services delivery
through the Legal Services Corporation.
E. The Legal Services Corporation Act
The purpose of the new Act was to depoliticize legal services.
Compromise was possible because, while the opponents of legal services
wanted to restrict the activities which could be engaged in by legal
services attorneys, those on the inside were happy to remove the legal
services programme from the OEO structure which subjected it to ex-
ecutive and legislative politics. The new Act created, in 1974, an inde-
pendent entity called the Legal Services Corporation ("the Corpora-
tion"), governed by an eleven member Board of Directors, appointed by
the President, with the approval of the Senate. There are some limita-
tions on political party control. The Corporation, like the OEO, was
essentially a funding organization, with its primary purpose being the
disbursement of federal funds to local programmes. In this respect,
there was little discontinuity with the old programme. However, the
Legal Services Corporation Act attempted, quite controversially, to
limit the activities of legal services lawyers. They were prohibited from
taking cases having to do with school desegregation and abortion for no
other reason than these were the only two successful substantive law
limitations in the Congressional debates."' They were also restricted in
the political activities they could engage in (no picketing, striking, lob-
bying or working for political campaigns). In addition, to meet the de-
mands of the judicare lobby, the Corporation was required to under-
take a delivery systems study to fund and then evaluate the feasibility
of alternatives to the staff attorney model of delivery. In most other
respects, OEO innovations were preserved. For example, the back-up
centres, class actions, law reform suits and legislative advocacy were all
left untouched.
There was some initial controversy over the membership of the
53 See George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation (1976), 61 Cornell L. Rev.
Greene, et aL, supra note 21.
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original Board. After a Board consisting of several moderate law
professors, prominent attorneys and the mandatory client members was
constituted, however, the controversy subsided. The first Director of the
Corporation, former Dean of the Stanford Law School, Thomas Er-
hlich, transformed the official rhetoric of the programme. Instead of
publicly advocating the activist role of legal services lawyers who are to
"uncover the legal causes of poverty, remodel the systems which gener-
ate the cycle of poverty and assign new social, legal and political tools
and vehicles to move poor people from deprivation, depression and de-
spair to opportunity, hope and ambition," 55 the goal of the new Legal
Services Program was "equal access to justice."'56 The focus of legal
services, at least in the Corporation's public pronouncements, was to
achieve minimum access for the poor to the legal system by making
available two attorneys per 10,000 poor. The Corporation realigned its
funding priorities so that new programmes, primarily rural program-
mes and those in the South and Southwest, which had received dispro-
portionately little funding under OEO, were funded. Only time will tell
whether this "access" goal was a brilliant political tactic to defuse the
national attention given to legal services activities so that the local
programmes could continue to go about their work quietly, or a con-
servative shift to a neutral and relatively easily attained and, some have
argued, meaningless goal.
57
The major trends in legal services delivery from this new form will
be reviewed below, but it is useful, once again to review the continuities
and discontinuities from the earlier periods. First and most impor-
tantly, a visitor to a legal services office in 1975 would hardly notice a
difference in the office from the earlier OEO period. Except for forms
from the national office requesting statistical information on caseloads,
now labelled "LSC" rather than "OEO" there was little to mark the
change. The new administrative regulations, consistent with the statute,
defined client eligibility (125 percent of the Federal Office of Manage-
ment and Budget Poverty line), impermissible lawyer activity (picket-
ing), procedures for processing client grievances, procedures for arriv-
ing at programme priorities where the resources were inadequate to
meet the needs and procedures for the filing of grant proposals and
financial requests. The Corporation had itself become, debatably, one
of the government agencies that it had argued, in other contexts, were
required to provide procedural due process when refusing aid or service
Supra note 23.
Legal Services Corporation Annual Report (1975-76).
47 Supra note 23.
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to a potential client. Class action lawsuits were to be approved by pro-
ject directors, but seldom were. In short, the work remained the same
with a slight increase in the amount of federal bureaucratic interven-
tion. Programmes were subject to evaluation from regional offices, but
there was not much change in these procedures from earlier OEO days.
Indeed, as Congressional appropriations for programmes increased,
more programmes were created, without much of a corresponding in-
crease in Corporation staff, so there were fewer people available to
monitor and evaluate an increasing number of programmes.
By 1978, there were over 335 programmes nationwide with over
5,000 lawyers and 1,300 paralegals, funded at a level of over $250 mil-
lion.58 The programmes remained local with their own hiring authority,
local boards of directors or community advisory boards, but with a na-
tional backbone to support and protect them with money, rhetoric,
training programmes and occasionally, legal services. Some local
programmes were occasionally sued for what they did and the national
staff stepped in to assist in representation of the programme.
Differences from the OEO programme were quite subtle. Once
again the language changes are interesting. Instead of "legal services,"
the programme became known as "the Corporation" an ironic use of
terminology considering the purpose of the programme, however unar-
ticulated, to redistribute wealth and represent individuals, frequently
against corporations. Local programmes became "recipients" (of the
federal grants) or LSP's (Local Service Programmes) or "applicants"
(for funds); clients became "applicants" (for service); attorneys became
employees, "project directors," managers or senior counsel. In short,
the terminology changes reflected a subtle bureaucratization or man-
agement orientation of the programme. This was not all bad. To some
it signified the coming of age and legitimacy of the programme and
some urged that legal services lawyers be treated more like members of
the increasing army of federal government lawyers. Others have argued
that this attempt to depoliticize the programme was dangerous, a dor-
mant volcano, ready to explode (prophetic in light of recent events)
because of the inherently political character of the work and the poten-
tial unconstitutionality of restrictions on the programme.59 The delivery
systems study loomed quietly in the background. Some feared it would
recommend dismantling of staff attorney programmes and others criti-
cized it as "captured" by the proponents of the staff delivery system.
There was some discussion of whether the access goals of funding were
Legal Services Corporation Annual Report (1978).
89 Greene, et al., supra note 21.
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spreading insufficient funds too thin, with turnover being a constant
problem in legal services and proposals for salary increases in competi-
tion with the funding of new programmes.6 0 But, the major develop-
ments which have taken hold with the new Corporation, are those with
which this paper started, the professionalism of the attorneys in the
1970s and the politicization of the programme in the 1980s.
VI. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
LAWYERS: THE 1970s
One of the most significant developments in legal services in the
1970s was the professionalization of legal services. Several things are
meant by this. First, the legal services programme had developed suffi-
cient stability and legitimacy that lawyers could consider themselves
committed to a long career in legal services work. Second, the work
itself had been done for a sufficiently long period that it had become
rationalized, predictable and some, like Gary Bellow would go so far as
to say, routinized, so that being a legal services lawyer consisted of a
regularized set of tasks. Third, training and socialization of legal ser-
vices attorneys conducted on national, regional and local levels permit-
ted legal services attorneys to learn their trade and the ideologies and
tasks which comprised it. Fourth, the work of legal services lawyers
became sufficiently complex and specialized that it comprised its own
body of knowledge and practice, distinguishing or segregating legal ser-
vices lawyers from other members of the bar. Fifth, while seemingly
contradicting the fourth development, legal services lawyers gained ac-
ceptance by the rest of the bar, participating in bar activities and gen-
erally became more accepted by some, though certainly not all, parts of
the establishment bar. In addition, one could say that the programmes
themselves became more professionalized, regularized and bureaucra-
tized as they employed more paralegals, specially trained to work in
certain fields and developed systemized ways for dealing with client's
problems (computerized pleadings, intake protocols and programme
wide systems for establishing case priorities). In short, the offices be-
came more and more like other law offices, which just happened to be
funded by the government. Indeed, many programmes received and
spent funds to refurbish their offices and in many communities the
"neighbourhood" office was replaced by centralized offices which
achieved economies of scale using modern law office technology.
" Katz, Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Involvement, Reform and the Turnover Prob-
lem in the Legal Service Program (1978), 12 Law & Soc. Rev. 275.
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These observations can be made because the legal services pro-
gramme of the 1970s was the subject of much study. Since the Legal
Services Corporation Act authorized the delivery system study, a vari-
ety of lawyers, law professors and social scientists were invited to look
at legal services programmes to supplement the usual cadre of internal
evaluators. This "invited" study was accompanied by a variety of other
studies done by interested, as well as disinterested, observers.61
The picture that emerges from these studies is that of the legal
professional who, having become acclimated to his work, is not en-
gaged, at least not day to day, in the political struggle of attacking
those who create poverty or in redistributing wealth, that is the bogey-
man of the legal services opponents. According to Gary Bellow, former
legal services attorney and presently law professor and teacher of legal
services lawyers, the practice of legal services lawyers in the 1970s was
characterized by routine case handling, frequent case settlements, low
client autonomy, encouragement rather than discouragement of the
passive dependence of poor clients62 and narrowed definitions of client
needs.63 Bellow attributed much of this lawyer behaviour to the crush-
ing pressure of high caseloads," the complexity of cases and the emer-
gency quality of so many of the cases. Bellow has noted:
The increasing amount of regulation and law-governed activity in the United
States makes the possible number of cases in any given poor population ex-
tremely large, if not unlimited. Every conflict in the family, at school, at work or
with a vast array of governmental institutions has some legal aspect - that is, it
is capable of being handled in whole or in part by a lawyer. Moreover, it is now
reasonably well established that demand for legal services increases with supply.
The more lawyers who are available, the more clients who will seek their help."
Thus, for Bellow, the practice that now characterizes many legal
services offices (his work is based on reviewing hundreds of files and
offices) is an organized and highly bureaucratized practice, in which
"1 For the major studies of legal services programmes to date see, supra notes 3, 6, 12, 23
and 24. As well, see, Handler, Hollingsworth and Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal
Rights (1978); Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality (1979), 26 Soc. Problems 599; Menkel-
Meadow and Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services: Individual Decisions in Work Pri-
orities (1983), 5 Law & Pol. Q. 237. This list of studies in not meant to be exhaustive, but is
confined primarily to empirical studies of what was and is occurring in the LSC legal services
offices.
"' Matthews and Weiss, What Can Be Done: A Neighborhood Lawyer's Credo (1967), 47
Boston U. L. Rev. 231.
63 Supra notes 3 and 23.
64 Average caseloads hovered between 100 and 400 cases per lawyer per year: Auerbach
Corp., Office of Legal Services Individual Project Evaluation Final Report (1971).
" Supra note 23, and Bellow and Kettleson, The Politics of Scarcity in Legal Services Work
(1979), 36 NLADA Briefcase 5.
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short cuts are pursued and established routines are followed in many
cases. The legal services lawyer of this description is little different
than the personal injury lawyer, who handles many claims routinely, or
from the new legal clinic lawyers who hope, by systematizing every-
thing, that they can increase their volume and income. 0 Lipsky and
Hosticka have called this form of practice a "street level bureaucracy"
which prevents the client from distinguishing the legal services lawyer
from the welfare bureaucrat the lawyer is supposed to be fighting.
Looking at a different group of legal services attorneys, Jack Katz
has observed a similar phenomenon. For him, the class action litigators
of the 1960s and 1970s have become the "managers" of the poverty
industry. That is, in their efforts to reform the welfare system and
other governmental systems, the activist lawyers have served to ration-
alize the welfare rules and bureaucracies and, in the course of so doing,
have legitimated the treatment of the poor as a separate class with a
need for their own specially trained lawyers and other professionals to
manage their programmes. According to Katz, the ultimate legacy of
legal services lawyers has been their role in "legalizing poverty," mak-
ing reform activity in the form of litigation a "professional, apolitical
matter." 67 This reform litigation has itself become a routine matter as
attorneys send, cross-country, for each other's legal pleadings and at-
tend conferences to discuss legal strategies as would any law firm's liti-
gation department. Law suits, which once commanded front page head-
lines, are now replicated regularly from one jurisdiction to another. The
effect of this form of practice, says Katz, has been for the legal services
machinery to stabilize, regularize and insulate programmes for the poor
in separate, but legally monitorable, government agencies. One reason
for this development is the demise of supporting and energizing social
movements in the 1960s. The social movements of the 1960s were re-
placed with a professional interest in maintaining and improving work-
ing conditions for the lawyers themselves. Without the political and so-
cial battles to motivate them, legal services attorneys have turned
inward.
This is borne out by the development in the 1970s of a unioniza-
tion movement in legal services with the stated goals of limiting
caseloads, increasing salaries and rationalizing professional develop-
ment and advancement criteria. At the time of this writing, there were
legal services unions operating in many of the major urban and state
wide programmes, with a national union of legal services workers being
" Menkel-Meadow, The 59th Street Legal Clinic: Evaluation of An Experiment (1979).
41 Katz, supra note 12.
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organized from New York, by the organizers of the first successful le-
gal services attorneys strike. This concern with working conditions and
hostility to management 8 are signs of the growing pains of a pro-
gramme that, as of 1980, had come of age.
In 1980, there were over 6,200 attorneys and 2,800 paralegals
working in the programme and $321 million had been allocated to it.
In a programme that had been committed to equality, the sheer num-
bers had produced the need for the management and hierarchy that so
many legal services attorneys had rejected ideologically in the early
years of the programme.
While the programme fought new battles internally, its lawyers
generally banded together when confronted by an external enemy. This
"insularity," criticized by Bellow as rigidifying the programme's ap-
proach to problems, coupled with the access formula for funding pur-
poses, prevented experimentation with new legal forms or ways of prac-
tice. Indeed, the Legal Service Delivery System study concluded that
the structured staff attorney programme was the most cost effective
form of delivery of legal services, especially law reform, due to the
"professional expertise" that such offices had developed. The study ac-
knowledged the possibility that some judicare programmes were more
effective in rural areas or with respect to particular types of cases, such
as family law or wills. These are cases less likely to be within the "pov-
erty managing" repertoire of the legal services programmes. Thus, in
the "quiescent" 1970s, the lawyers seemed to be shrinking from inno-
vation and conflict and working toward standardizing their work prod-
ucts, with the internal control over their own work product that charac-
terizes professional work. The programme attempted to codify
standards of practice for civil lawyers for the poor.
The most troubling aspect of this "professionalization" or normali-
zation of legal services work is its bureaucratic quality which was noted
by Bellow, Hosticka and Katz. In empirical work on how legal services
lawyers allocate their resources over an almost unending demand for
service, it was found that the lawyers spent an average of twenty min-
utes on a task and were engaged primarily in routine, non-visible
tasks.69 Legal services lawyers claimed to be in control of their work,
because of their commitment to professional ideals, but their time
68 Supra note 1I.
'9 Supra note 61, and Meadow and Menkel-Meadow, "Decisonmaking Priorities Among Le-
gal Services Attorney" (paper presented to the Western Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, Mar, 26-28, 1981, Denver, Co.) and "Personalized Justice in Legal Service:
Nonbureaucratic Models of Professional Decision-Making" (paper presented to the Midwest Po-
litical Science Association Annual Meeting, Apr. 28- May 1, 1982, Milwaukee, Wis.).
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sheets indicated otherwise: they were frequently subject to interruptions
and demands by clients and others.
* If this picture of professionalization and routinization of the prac-
tice is accurate, what can account for it? Are legal services lawyers of
the 1970s less politically committed than their older brothers and sisters
of the 1960s? The data on this question is conflicting. Earlier studies
by Erlanger"° found, in a national sample, that legal services lawyers of
the 1960s were no different from their colleagues in other forms of
practice, in terms of political identification, activities, schools attended,
socio-economic background. At the same time, Erlanger found that
whatever it was that motivated a legal services attorney to become a
lawyer for the poor, he or she was likely to remain in a career path
committed to a broad conception of "the public interest" even if he or
she left legal services.71 Data, at least for one limited area, seem to
indicate that the legal services lawyers of the 1970s were indeed highly
politically active and motivated and came disproportionately from the
more elite schools of their area, along with an expressed purpose of
making legal services their permanent career.72
The increased routinization and professionalization of the pro-
gramme testifies to its success. For much of the 1970s, the programme
seemed well-established and during the Carter administration, substan-
tial funding increases were almost automatic. Legal services lawyers
achieved a fair amount of respectability and for those who wanted to
make a career of it, the desire for seniority, longevity and predictability
in work is understandable. What legal services lawyers did not receive
in salary they sought to compensate for in job security. To the extent
that some of the conflict with the outside world had subsided, some of
the conflict has turned inward in the form of unionization and hierar-
chical disputes. Most of the easy-to-win lawsuits (for procedural due
process, and constitutional entitlements) had been brought. The change
in the composition of the United States Supreme Court made victory,
in more complex suits, more difficult. Indeed, the research arm of the
Corporation commissioned studies from law professors in an attempt to
forge new theories to strike back at the limitations on access for the
poor to federal courts begun by the conservative Burger Court. Cases
were still being won at the lower federal levels and, increasingly, legal
services lawyers turned to state courts and legislative advocacy. The
continually expanding client rolls (over 1.5 million clients were seen in
70 See Erlanger, supra note 24.
71 Cramton, supra note 6, at 530 and Katz, supra note 58.
72 Meadow and Menkel-Meadow, supra note 36.
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1980) and other evidence, such as increasing unemployment, made it
difficult for attorneys to think that they were participating in an effort
which was actually decreasing poverty in the United States.
Thus, attention seemed turned away from the mission of amelio-
rating or eliminating poverty, to becoming the most effective possible
lawyer for poor clients. This was an ironic turn of events considering
the next major development in legal services. While some have labelled
the quiescent period of professional development in the 1970s as a sort
of personal "survivalism", it simply foreshadowed the programatic
survivalism which characterized the next era in legal services.
VII. THE POLITICIZATION OF THE LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAMME: THE 1980s
With the election of President Reagan in 1980, the quiescence was
over. Reagan and his conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation,
recommended a total dismantling of the programme attributed, by
most observers, to Reagan's own personal dissatisfaction with the legal
services activism of the California Rural Legal Assistance Program
while he was governor of California. With this, the fourth period of
legal services development in the United States began, one which will
likely be called the "Survival Era" when the final history is written.
From proposals that recommended total abolition of the programme, to
recommendations that legal services compete with other social
programmes on the state level for "Block Grant funding", to a vast
array of substantive limitations on what a severely gutted programme
would be permitted to do, the issues were again joined. Many attorneys
abandoned the programme. In Los Angeles alone, almost one-half of
the programme's attorneys accepted a "golden boot" bonus of sever-
ance pay that would enable some to set up solo practices. Many wh6
remained were demoralized, but for those who organized and reacti-
vated themselves, debate on the old issues was pursued with a ven-
geance and with a difference. Now armed with statistics of their victo-
ries and accomplishments, legal services attorneys formed alliances
with their clients, the establishment and organized bar and learned how
to master the complex Congressional budget process and lobby for the
continuation of the programme. Ironically, the entire programme was
scheduled for legislative reauthorization in 1981, as well as the usual
reappropriation process, and to his good fortune President Reagan had
all eleven national Board appointments to be made in his first year of
office, even if the programme survived the Congressional budgetary
process.
A brief review of the political issues surrounding the refunding
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and reauthorization process will make clear how continuous the issues
surrounding legal services for the poor are in the United States. It is
too early to formulate final conclusions about this period; indeed at this
writing the process has begun anew for fiscal year 1983. This fourth
period of legal services development will, if it has not already done so,
make clear the permanently political nature of legal services for the
poor in the United States. The resolution of the political disputes this
time may radically change the character of legal services. It has al-
ready politicized, in a more conventional party politics way, the legal
services lawyers. At issue are the controversies with which this paper
began:
1) Should funding for legal services be public or private?
2) Should the role of legal services be to provide access to the
legal system for the poor on the same individual case basis as
others or should legal services have a role in promoting dis-
tributive justice through commutative justice?73
3) Should the poor have the same lawyers as the non-poor and
be integrated in legal and other systems with the non-poor or
should they have their own expert advocates and social
systems?
4) What is the most effective (cost and efficacious) system for
delivering legal services to the poor?
5) Should the poor be given legal services at all, as a matter of
right, or as a gratuity for which they must be deserving and
grateful?
At the time of Reagan's inauguration in January of 1981 the Le-
gal Services Corporation was funding 323 local programmes through-
out the country, at a total cost of $321 million. This money served one
and half million poor people in all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Micronesia and Guam. These funds
paid the salaries and costs of mostly full time staff attorney program-
mes. Financial standards of eligibility, determined by national poverty
level budgets, provided that in order to receive free legal service, an
individual could earn no more than $5,388 annually and a family of
four could earn no more than $10,463. Distinguishing the American
system, from many other delivery systems for the poor, there is no in-
dependent determination of eligibility. In most offices, the client must
simply sign a form indicating what his income is and neither the attor-
ney nor any other body is expected to certify or verify this data. Con-
73 Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice (1969), 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 699.
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troversial as this procedure is, causing some critics to accuse clients of
receiving free service unjustifiably or under false pretenses,7 4 it is one
of the factors which accounts for the programme's low administrative
costs. Less than two percent of the entire annual budget is spent on
programme administration (most of it on national office salaries and
expenses), with another two percent being used for programme evalua-
tion and monitoring. In 1980, in addition to the staff attorney pro-
gramme, the Corporation funded over twenty judicare projects and fifty
contract arrangements under which private attorneys were paid for pro-
viding services to the poor. Many of these projects were designed to test
alternative delivery systems in areas that were not amenable to staff
attorney programmes such as in remote rural areas.
This funding and variety of delivery systems provided services in
the following matters to the poor people of America who were able to
















Asian or Pacific Islander 0.7%
The programme served a clientele that was primarily adult (only three
percent of those served were under eighteen with 12.5 percent of those
being served were over sixty).75 Data on the specific accomplishments
of this work is scarce. Some have attempted measures of the income
actually redistributed as a result of lawsuits brought.76 But, little is ac-
74 The author is not aware of any data which support such charges.
76 Data taken from Legal Services Corporation Annual Report (1980).
76 See Johnson and Stumpf, supra note 6; Katz, supra note 12; Carlin et al., supra note 20;
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tually known about the aggregate effects of successes of the pro-
gramme. Unfortunately, this has permitted the debate to be waged
with little edification and dooms the issues to conclusory and very parti-
san arguments. Thus, Reagan was able to appeal, in his efforts to
defund this "socialistic" programme, to two traditional values of the
American polity. The government should not give something for noth-
ing, at great public expense, in a nation committed to free market
mechanisms, however modified that free market might be in 1982, and
individuals should help themselves out of the conditions of poverty as so
many of our forebears, including President Reagan, have done. The
Reagan critique focused on several aspects of the programme: 1) its
"political activism," 2) its character as a "lawyer's programme," pro-
viding cash for lawyer salaries rather than for poor people directly, and
3) its "economic inefficiency." 77 These critiques are essentially linked
by Reagan's notions that individuals should act for themselves, directly
and alone, to achieve financial security in the United States.
The obvious criticism of the critique will not be belaboured here.
As others have argued elsewhere,78 lawyers have always been utilized
by those with the resources to use them to further their individual and
collective interests. To the extent that the taking of any legal action is
itself a political act in a free society, permitting an individual to use a
public forum to ask for the redress of grievances against either a public
or private entity or individual, inevitably results in some transfer of
funds or power (damages or injunction); the use of legal services by the
poor, whether in an individual case or a class action is no different a
"political act" then that of a corporation suing for a breach of contract.
Nevertheless, armed with its "mandate of the 1980 election" the
Reagan administration developed three strategies for the destruction of
legal services: 1) termination, 2) statutory limitation, and 3) political
interference. The effect of these proposals on the legal services commu-
nity was to re-ignite the political activism of those who believed in the
purposes of the programme and to develop some more sophisticated
thinking about how to deliver its service. The first two battles were
fought in the halls of Congress in 1981. Without reporting more fully
on the entire debate, it can be summed up by looking briefly at the
Congressional budget battles. Several budget proposals provided for no
Aronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform (unpub.. Ph.D. Dissertation, U. of California,
Berkeley, 1975) and Weisbrod, Handler and Konesar, Public Interest Law - An Economic and
Institutional Analysis (1978).
7 Cramton, supra note 6.
78 Id. and Auerbach, supra note 12.
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federal funding for legal services at all, others lumped federal govern-
mental support for legal services with all other social services to be
allocated by the states in a competitive block grant process, still others
proposed substantially reduced funding which would have cut the pro-
gramme by over two-thirds. These proposals were all part of the annual
reappropriation process. At the same time, the enabling legislation for
the Corporation, due to expire in 1981, had to be reauthorized if the
programme was to continue. Proposals ranged from no reauthorization
to several substantive limitations on what the programme could do that
would essentially eliminate most of its functions. These restrictions
included:
1) prohibition on class action suits against federal, state and
local governments;
2) prohibition on virtually all legislative or lobbying activities;
3) prohibition on the use of any funds to provide legal assis-
tance to promote defend or protect homosexuality;
4) limitations on those categories of aliens eligible for legal
assistance;
5) requirements that the local governing boards of legal services
programmes be appointed from or approved by local bar as-
sociations, subject to gubernatorial control;
6) transfer of the functions of the local staff attorney projects
either to the private bar or, as suggested by Reagan's Presi-
dential Advisor and a former law professor, Edwin Maese, to
the law schools, with law students providing assistance to the
poor under some attorney supervision.
Taken together the intention of these proposals was to eliminate,
or at least, severely curtail public or governmental support for legal
services for the poor, segregate the poor by giving them either no legal
service or legal services that were substantially different from those
available to those who could pay, and limit service to individual
casework for those morally deserving (not aliens or homosexuals),
which was thought to be the bare minimum legal service necessary
without effecting any substantial political or social change.
The United States had come full circle to the proposals for legal
aid that began this history one hundred years ago.
VIII. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE POOR
The response to these proposals makes clear one of the themes of
the development of legal services in the United States - it is an essen-
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tially political process, for it is a political matter to provide legal justice
for the poor. Whatever the temporary success of the neutral "equal
access to justice" goal in the 1970s, the change of a political regime
made clear the lack of national consensus about the importance of this
value. The response of the legal services community, which as de-
scribed above, has now become a sufficiently stable, professional, and
bureaucratic structure of its own, was to organize politically to defeat
the proposals and retain its existence. The individualistic survivalism of
the 1970s was channelled into a collective survivalism of the 1980s,
which at the time of this writing has proven relatively successful,
though not without its costs.
As the Reagan proposals were architected, several new groups
were formed in response to this effort to eliminate the programme. The
Advocates to Save Legal Services was formed as a national lobbying
group with former Vice-President Mondale at its head, demonstrating
the political partisanship of the issue. The Coalition for Legal Services,
comprised of members of the legal services community, staff attorneys,
paralegals, other lawyers and friends, served as a clearinghouse to mon-
itor legislative and budgetary developments. The Alliance for Legal
Services was formed, primarily by client-eligible constituents to per-
form similar functions. Most importantly a massive lobbying effort was
begun nationwide to deal with both the appropriation and reauthoriza-
tion process. Probably most visible and influential in this process was
the support of the established bar. Leaders of the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the most significant state and local bar associations held
press conferences, flew to Washington and actively lobbied in the Con-
gress. The result of this active political participation was relatively suc-
cessful. Appropriations were passed for $241 million for the fiscal year
1982, representing only a twenty-five percent cut and a temporary reso-
lution authorizing continued functioning did not change the substantive
limitations on operations that had been in existence since 1980.
The victory may be temporary, however. At the conclusion of the
budgetary process President Reagan began making his appointments to
the eleven member Board of Directors and appointed several individu-
als who were publicly hostile to the concept of legal services for the
poor. In a "midnight raid" on New Year's Eve 1981, members of the
new Board voted not to distribute the funds appropriated by Congress
to the local programmes. This action was later rescinded. Debate then
turned once again to the Congressional floors as confirmation hearings
of the new Board members resulted in some of the most acrimonious
hearings which ever occurred on the Senate floor. A lawsuit was filed to
challenge the constitutional propriety of these appointments.
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At the time of this writing, this entire process is about to repeat
itself. The Congressional budget for the fiscal year 1984 has not been
passed and once again proposals range from termination to transforma-
tion. It is unclear whether the legal services community can withstand
annual political struggles of the magnitude necessary just to maintain
the programme at marginal levels of effectiveness. With a new national
staff, appointed by an unsympathetic Board it is unclear what direction
will be emanating from the centre of power in Washington.
The politicization of the programme in the last few years has left
in its wake some important by-products that may change the direction
of legal services. These by-products are a mixed bag and it is difficult
to predict, at the present time, how they will be used in the coming
year. First, and potentially most significant, the legal services commu-
nity became involved and skillful in the mainstream partisan political
process. There is an irony in this in that the attorneys, criticized for
their "political activism" have in fact become more active and visibly
involved in the political process. Some would say that it is political ac-
tivity in the legislative domain that is more appropriate,7 9 but this ac-
tivity has led to the development of skills in lobbying and budgetary
processes that may easily be transmitted to substantive claims for the
poor (to wit, the current political struggles over Social Security and
Medicare). Second, the established bar has reaffirmed its support for
legal services. It is potentially problematic because this powerful lobby
could easily be transformed into support for judicare programmes, al-
though this has not yet happened. At the same time, as some have
pointed out, the most successful lobbying came not from the benefi-
ciaries of the programme, the client-eligible poor80 who are losing
countless other benefits in this era of Reaganomics, but from lawyers,
lending support to those who argue that the Legal Services Corpora-
tions Act is essentially a full-employment-for-lawyers act. There may
also have been a lost opportunity for working with clients to build the
community organizing strategies, useful in other contexts, advocated in
the 1960s. The failure of clients to participate actively in this battle,
however, may signify the importance of legal services. Less than twenty
years after the founding of modern legal services, the poor are no more
able to represent themselves efficaciously in the public arena than they
were when the "War on Poverty" was first declared.
79 Hazard, supra note 71, and Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort (1970), 37 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 242.
80 Mensah, The U.S. Legal Services Program Need to Renew Involvement of the Poor (un-
pub.. paper prepared for National Legal Aid and Defender Assoc.. Washington, D.C., 1981).
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Sadly, this "successful" lobbying effort was not without its costs.
Without final results, it can be reported impressionistically, from time
studies of legal services lawyers during 1981, that for many individual
attorneys, and for some whole programmes, time spent on the survival
effort involved a substantial part of the work effort. In addition, be-
cause of fears that the programme would be cut, many attorneys left
the programmes in anticipation of lay-offs. Most major programmes
were forced to close some offices, suspend client intake altogether and
eliminate whole classes of case service. In Los Angeles, for example,
the family law center was closed, providing no free service for divorce
(reminiscent of 1880). Thus, while the legislative termination proposals
were not successful, Reagan may have been successful in sufficiently
crippling the programme with his strategy to essentially suspend mean-
ingful client service. One by-product of this fallout, however, seems
promising. Many of the attorneys who left legal services took the op-
portunity to continue their work in other forms, continuing their com-
mitment to access to justice work.81 It can be reported that of the attor-
neys in legal services programmes who I have been studying for two
years, approximately one-third of them left in this period, the vast ma-
jority of whom went into sole or small practices with other legal ser-
vices attorneys to continue their work on a low fee basis. If the judicare
systems replace staff attorney programmes, these are the attorneys
(former legal services attorneys) who will seek such funds. That process
is likely to be extremely political and the lessons learned in the present
era may be quite relevant.
Furthermore, those programmes that remain have begun to ex-
plore alternative forms of financing. Some programmes are exploring
the legal clinic structure, with a small fee-for-service payment in vol-
ume practices going to finance other forms of work. Other programmes
have started to seek private funding from foundations and corporations.
(Once again we return to the history of 1880.) What these attorneys
have learned is that government financing may have some of the same
limitations of private funding - ebbs and flows depending on the polit-
ical and economic climate and substantive limits on the work that can
be done with private financing.
There are two possible interpretations of these developments. One
is that a more creative period of finance and work structure has begun
with a balance of private and public funding to support different types
of work in different types of formats. This is the more hopeful view.
11 Erlanger, supra note 24.
[VOL. 22, NO. I
Legal Services
The other is that legal services is faced, in 1982i with the same dilem-
mas it faced in 1880 - a lack of commitment to the principle of legal
services for the poor. For, in their present search for private funds to
cushion the loss of public funds, legal services attorneys hope, perhaps
naively, that they will receive private support with no strings attached.
In a recent presentation to one legal services programmes' Board of
Directors, one well-known foundation confidentially suggested, that the
programme "package" its cases and present pieces of its litigation for
financing to those who found the causes "worthy". Cases involving the
plight of handicapped children were considered worthy. But would law-
suits against employers for discriminatory hiring or unsafe working
conditions fare as well? Thus, this new era has us facing the same
questions with which we began. More poor people have received legal
services, but the number of poor in the United States is increasing, due
to social programme and cash payment cuts, at the same time that
public commitment to legal services for the poor seems to be decreas-
ing. The time is certainly ripe for the exploration of other alternatives.
VIII. DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL AID OTHER THAN
LEGAL SERVICES
Although this report has been concerned primarily with the provi-
sion of legal services for the poor in its most common form in the
United States, the legal services programme, it is important to review
briefly, however, other developments that may have some bearing on
the poor's access to legal justice. There were two significant develop-
ments in the area of civil justice in the late seventies and early eighties.
The first was a short-lived proposal that would have made pro bono
publico (free legal services for public good) work mandatory for all
attorneys. The Kutak Commission on the Revision of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility proposed a Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct provision which would have required all American lawyers to
devote a stated amount of time on an annual basis to providing free
legal services. The proposal was extremely controversial both in terms
of defining the permissible categories of work (for example, would ser-
vice on boards of hospitals, charities and school boards count?) and
enforcement. After an intermediary proposal which first, decreased the
number of hours and then made the proposal optional and voluntary,
the proposal was dropped. Although some argued that it was essential
to communicate the public service aspect of our publicly chartered but
privately controlled profession by requiring all lawyers to do some pub-
lic service, most found this proposal to be counter to the American
principles of individual freedom and free (meaning you must pay for
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what you want) enterprise. Had this proposal been adopted it would
have represented a truly revolutionary development in the access to jus-
tice movement, though it remained unclear how securities lawyers
would have delivered services to welfare clients. Although it was ulti-
mately unsuccessful, the fact that this proposal became a topic on the
public agenda of American lawyers suggests that it may become a pos-
sibility at a future time.
The second development has also yet to be realized. In a case involving
the termination of parental rights of a woman prisoner, the Supreme
Court held that there was no constitutionally mandated right to counsel
in such civil cases.82 Yet some commentators have suggested that this
case will eventually be limited to its special facts and the case has set
the stage for a possible future holding that lawyers will become a mat-
ter of constitutional right in civil matters.83 Lawyers already are re-
quired in some civil proceedings - legal victories that were won in the
era of procedural due process reform of the sixties and seventies.
In the civil area, public interest and legal rights organizations such
as the Center for Law and Social Policy, the NAACP, ACLU and the
Womens' Legal Defense Fund, continued to bring cases on behalf of
the underrepresented in American society, primarily in the form of test
cases, financed by private contributions and special government
grants." Unfortunately, as legal services programmes and other social
action programmes began to join the competition for funding, some of
these programmes began to fall on hard times. The Council for Public
Interest Law was formed as a consortium of public interest firms
searching for ways to maintain a stable source of funding and presence
in the American legal arena. Ironically, the vagueness of the term
"public interest" has permitted the founding of such organizations as
the Pacifica Foundation and the Mountain States Legal Defense Fund,
on the same basis as the older organizations, where the purpose is to
protect conservative business and anti-labour, anti-environmental
interests.
In other civil developments, law schools continued to supply an ad-
ditional source of legal services for the poor as clinical education grew
in many American law schools. In such programmes, law students per-
form the tasks of lawyers, usually under the supervision of a law pro-
a Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, supra note 5.
See Schwartz, Lawyers and the Legal Profession (1981).
See Weisbrod, et al., supra note 73.
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fessor. Such services have been offered to those unable to pay for law-
yers on the assumption that no one who could pay would want a law
student lawyer. Unions and teachers and other employee groups began
in the late 1970s to provide group and pre-paid legal service plans to
their members, but this phenomenon has not yet proven as popular as
first imagined and given the present economic recession it appears un-
likely that such benefit programmes will increase in the short run. The
legal clinic movement appears quite visible in the United States with
volume, low-fee-for service offices opening up in department stores and
other locations. To the extent that anything is known about clinics at
this time, and there is little hard data,8 5 clinics appear to be serving a
working class to low middle income clientele. Even at their lower rate,
fees are still too high for those on fixed government benefit incomes.
Furthermore, there is no firm evidence that legal clinic fees are in fact
lower than those charged in more conventional practices.
There have been other efforts to increase access to the legal system
by decreasing the costs of access. In some states pleadings and pack-
ages legal documents are sold commercially so that individuals can pro-
ceed without a lawyer at all, usually in such matters as non-fault di-
vorce or small claims courts. In addition, Neighborhood Justice Centers
and other experiments in mediation have attempted to eliminate the
cost of judges, formal pleadings and other aspects of the formal justice
system.86 Increasingly, however, developments such as these are criti-
cized on the basis that the poor must accept a cheaper, second justice
that the better off would never choose and that prevents any real con-
frontation of social and political injustice in the formal justice system,
which is best able to order rule changes.8
7
Legal assistance for indigent criminal defendants remains the
province of localities. Because the United States Constitution requires
the "effective assistance of counsel" in all criminal matters, the prose-
cuting jurisdiction must supply lawyers for the defendants. The most
common form of criminal legal aid is the local Public Defender pro-
gramme, a full-time salaried staff programme that resembles the legal
services office. Some localities contract with members of the local bar
to provide all or some of the criminal legal services (but in other locali-
ties, only major felonies are contracted out). Politically there has al-
ways been an alignment or affinity between legal service and public
" Supra note 64.
, Hofrichter, "Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American Capital-
ism," in Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice (1982).
87 See Abel, id.
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defender lawyers and programmes but, except for the voluntary mem-
bership National Legal Aid and Defender Association, there are no for-
mal ties between the two programmes. In recent years there have been
several proposals to create a national independent funding organization,
similar to the Legal Services Corporation, for criminal legal aid, as a
way to standardize and nationalize the services provided. In the present
political climate, however, it seems unlikely that such a proposal will
succeed.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL AID
This report has outlined three distinct historical periods of the de-
velopment of legal aid for the poor in the United States and has sug-
gested that a fourth has begun. Yet, despite the existence of some form
of legal aid for the poor for at least one hundred years, the notion that
legal aid should be as a matter of right, and not privilege, in as legalis-
tic a society as the United States, is not yet widely or publicly ac-
cepted. There are now many more lawyers and other forms of legal
professionals providing such services and the expenditures on such
programmes have increased exponentially over the years. There is now
an establishment of poverty lawyers who are sophisticated and special-
ized in what they do. Yet, the surprising thing is the continuing pres-
ence of the same issues which faced legal aid in the early years. Who-
ever or whatever provides funds, legal aid will want control over what it
does. In this respect the poor are different from others who receive le-
gal services who are able to decide for themselves, with their lawyers,
what it is that they want done, whether it be lobbying, lawsuits or gen-
eral business advice. It is clear that without the ability to pay for your
own legal service in the United States, you cannot control what will be
done. (This can be contrasted, in many respects, to the provision of
medical services to the poor, where some choices remain with doctor
and patient.) Why is this so?
Going to court is a political act. Contesting a governmental action
that threatens to terminate benefits is a political act. Demanding that a
landlord maintain a home in habitable condition as a condition of being
paid is a political act. All of these acts are assertions or expressions of
power or of a right. Some powers or rights can be given or shared with-
out necessarily diminishing other people's enjoyment of them: other
forms of power or rights are necessarily competitive. Thus, providing
those without power or resources with the means to attempt to obtain
some is as much a political issue as the protection of those with power
and resources. The debate surrounding the substantive limitations of
[VOL. 22, NO, I
Legal Services
what legal services attorneys can do poses this issue at its most ex-
treme. Why else would opponents of class actions or suits against gov-
ernmental entities fight so hard to prohibit these forms of legal action
unless they feared they might be successful? If the legal system itself
were not political what would these opponents have to fear from deci-
sions by neutral and learned judges? At their most powerful, attorneys
are nothing more than advocates for their clients and a disinterested
judge, ironically, politically appointed or elected, will determine the
merits of the cause. The American Code of Professional Responsiblity
for lawyers permits advocacy for the extension or change of a rule of
law. This advocacy, it seems, must be purchased. And, the question
now is who will pay for it?
This report may seem polemical, but in 1984, in the United States,
the question of what legal services will be available for the poor is
highly polemic. Because the American legal system provides some
unique procedural and substantive devices for access to justice and rule
change, it is that much more controversial because of the role legal
change may play in social change. Thus far, the United States has pro-
vided primarily one answer to that question. Publicly funded, profes-
sional staff attorney programmes which segregate the poor from others
in receipt of their legal services supplemented by some private funding
and some few alternative delivery models are the norm. Whether there
could be other answers to that question, in the form of a greater diver-
sity of legal services delivery must depend, to a large extent, on the
fund available for this purpose. This issue is both a political issue and a
professional one. Will enough funds be allocated, and with sufficient
freedom to provide adequate legal services at all, let alone in new
forms? Will the professional poverty lawyers maintain the commitment
to their clients to do what is best for poor people, rather than for them-
selves? These are the issues which will emerge in what is hoped will be
a new era of legal aid.
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